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This two-part working paper series represents a distillation of practical approaches with regard to the 
successful management of so-called “legacy assets” which include both impaired as well as non-
performing loans, particularly in those in the real estate and property sectors. This two-part set uses case 
examples, based on developments in Spain during 2012 with the eventual foundation of SAREB, drawing 
on national, other European and North American experiences as well as expert practices. The set should 
be considered in their entirety. Part 1 paper outlines the context in Spain in 2012 during the height of the 
credit-sovereign crisis. Part 2 provides an assessment of the strategies, implementation issues and 
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2.1  Introduction 
The proper management of impaired assets as well as resolution of the related problematic loans and 
assets is amongst the most critical and complex tasks of successful bank restructuring. If several banks are 
involved a national approach should be considered. 
 
In 2012 the need to resolve the very large burden of legacy portfolios, which are at the heart of Spain’s 
continuing financial crisis, was acute. This situation has led the Banco de España (BdE) to engage support 
Theory and Practice - Justin Jenk, Raktas working paper series 
Strategies for Managing Banks’ Legacy Assets: an example from Spain 2012 – Part 2 Assessment of strategies & their implementation 
Justin Jenk  
Oxford, February 2015  
 
© justinjenk.com. All rights reserved.Unauthorised reproduction and use prohibited Page 2 
 
from expert institutions from amongst other central banks (such as Sweden’s Riksbanken) as well as 
expert practitioners (e.g., BlackRock, ERC, Raktas) 
 
The basis for bank stabilization and asset resolution strategies require an integrated and pragmatic 
approach from the central authorities guiding individual banks within an overall central, appropriately 
funded programme. 
 
This two-part working paper set draws on several sources. Primarily, it taps the experiences of 
practitioners with regard to establishing successfully resolution approaches across Europe. As such it 
captures better practices with regard to bank stabilization and asset resolution from over 35 national bank 
restructurings, bad banks and related agencies in addition to academic and expert literature. This working 
paper takes into account the realities of the Spanish market in 2012. It builds upon the discussions with 
BdE; the Fund for Orderly Restructuring of the Banking sector (FROB); industry associations (such as the 
Confederation of Spanish Savings Banks - CECA); individual banks and market participants operating in 
Spain that eventually led to the foundation of the Sociedad de Gestión de Activos procedentes de la 
Reestructuración Bancaria (SAREB). 
 
 
2.2  Summary 
In Spring 2012 the single most important issue facing the Spanish banking market was the bid/ask price 
gap that affected the non-performing loan market. This situation was acute for property and real estate 
related exposures as well as repossessed assets. Half-hearted attempts at industry consolidation, 
questionable M&A activities and an unwillingness to  Until that point, the Regulator and the Spanish 
authorities had resisted taking a proactive and directed approach as suggested by other experienced 
central banks and experts.  
 
The suggested approach was based on the (bad) bank resolution schemes successfully deployed in the 
Nordic markets over the last thirty years; in particular Securum (1992) and Swedbank’s Baltic initiative 
(2009) as well as experiences for Ireland and the US, amongst others. The suggested approach had two 
components:  
1. Encouraging individual banks to pursue a full set of asset resolution strategies while;   
2. Establishing a central financing agency (if not asset management company) as an overall 
strategic  umbrella  to  break  the  vicious  cycle  of  financing  to  bridge  this  price  gap  and  
facilitate resolutions.  
 
This perspective along with the challenges for the banking sector in Spain are discussed in the remaining 
sections of this Part 2 working paper (2.3 – 2.10) in terms of the implications to the legacy portfolios from 
possible resolution strategies and implementation considerations 
 
 
2.3  Context in Spain 2012 
In Spring 2012 the Spanish banking system had become encumbered with the product of questionable 
and delayed actions by the central authorities. Up until this time, the authorities had taken a ‘wait & see’ 




2.4 Overview of main resolution strategies 
In managing banking crises, international examples reveal that governments have tended to focus their 
approaches on a two-step process. In the first step, measures are taken to stabilize the banking system to 
avoid bank insolvencies. The second step is to follow strategies for asset resolution to cleanse the banks’ 
balance sheets. 
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While there have  been many bank stabilization/asset resolution approaches taken by governments during 
the last 50 years a sub-set of (better) precedent examples seemed more relevant given Spain’s situation in 
2012. These precedent examples include: the United States with the Resolution Trust Corporation, TARP, 
Public-Private Investment Program (P-PIP); Sweden with Securum/Retriva; Ireland with NAMA and; 
Germany with FMSA (Exhibit 4). 
 
Exhibit 4: International solutions 
 
 
These precedents examples are synthetically assessed below. 
 
United States 
The US authorities have proven to be the most adept at managing systemic banking crises. The US 
approaches (over the last four decades) are instructive given their focus on market-driven 
resolutions. Of particular relevance is the concept of participations pioneered by the RTC and used 
in TARP and its P- PIP. 
 
The Resolution Trust Corporation’s (RTC) was an asset management company established by the 
US authorities in 1989. It was an effective organizational and governance structure, giving it 
operational independence and staffed with skilled personnel. It resolved or closed 747 ‘thrifts’ 
(saving banks) with total assets of $394 billion. It was funded by a special agency (REFCORP). RTC 
pioneered the concept of equity participations, allowing RTC to benefit from gains in the banks’ 
portfolios through a series of structured products (i.e., MIFs, Mortgage Trusts, N-series, a Land 
Fund, etc.). RTC created funds composed of pools of legacy assets that were offered to investors. 
These funds were vendor financed (up to 75%).The RTC experience (and that of the earlier RDC, of 
the 1930s) have been utilized in the recent TARP programme. 
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The current Toxic Asset Relief Program (TARP) initially provided preferred capital injections and 
asset protection schemes to avoid a banking collapse. This was coupled with a relief on ‘mark-to-
market’ accounting rules for illiquid assets. In a second step, in an attempt to help the banks to 
clean their balance sheets from the toxic assets, the Public-Private Investor Programme (P-PIP) 
was established to provide leverage and equity capital to facilitate toxic asset transactions. 
While TARP’s bank stabilization effort has been judged a success, as most of the capital injections 
have by now been repaid and preferred dividends received; the P-PIP has been viewed less 
favourably, as it did not meet its ambitions. Only $30bn of transactions out of an initially foreseen 
one trillion dollars have been completed. P-PIP’s failure to encourage further asset resolutions is 
widely attributed to a critical design element: changes in accounting rules that allowed the banks 
to avoid marking their assets to market. The banks had an incentive to delay crystalizing their 
losses over time. 
 
Sweden 
In Sweden, an equally directed (and for the time radical) route was followed. In 1992 a systemic 
banking crisis, based  on  a  speculative  property  bubble,  was  avoided  by  a combination of:   
blanket  state  guarantees (that  were provided to all the banks) to stabilize the banks as well as a 
proactive and structured resolution approach. During 1992, Swedish property prices declined 
rapidly (nearly 50% peak to trough), producing enormous credit losses on the banks’ balance 
sheets. Simultaneously, the Swedish economy went into recession. 
 
Very  quickly  the  Swedish authorities  decided  to  move  into  an  asset  resolution  phase.  
Nordbanken and Götabanken were nationalized.  Next, their core banking activities were 
separated to form one new banking entity: now known as Nordea (which today is the largest bank 
in the Nordic markets and most successful in Europe). At the same time, two fully recapitalized 
Asset Management Companies (AMCs) were established (Securum and Retriva) to house the non-
core Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and legacy assets. For asset resolution, the Securum portfolio 
was focused on real estate and property related assets (comprising about 2,500 commercial 
properties with an estimated market value of SEK 15bn-20bn; (circa €2bn-€2.5bn). Retriva’s 
portfolio was focused on corporate and industrial holdings. The combined portfolios amounted to 
an equivalent of 3% of GDP. Securum was established as an independent entity, wholly owned by 
the state but with independent professional management independent governance and a 15 year 
planning horizon. This long time horizon had an important and positive signaling effect to the 
market. Securum was operational within three months. 
 
Speed to resolution was deemed important to realise the overall resolution objective. Both AMCs 
followed a rapid path of ‘loan to asset’ conversion; resolving these assets through a combination 
of straight sales and IPOs of the real estate portfolios and industrial companies. A “valuation 
board” was formed and used  to  establish  and  ensure  transparent  valuations.  After the loan-
liquidation  phase, efforts focused on generating value in the assets. These disposals were 
achieved by selling liquid properties at the best possible price as soon as possible, as well as 
preparing illiquid properties for sale in specialized property SPV, which were eventually sold via 
IPOs as the market recovered. The speed of sales and valuations were criticized at the time. The 
subsequent positive performance of Securum and achievement of its objectives vindicated these 
decisions. 
 
Securum started out with a large portfolio of loans in default. The number of borrowers on its 
client register was about 1,000. By the middle of 1994, just 18 months after it was established, 
70% of the 800 limited companies were declared bankrupt or liquidated with most sales being 
concluded by 1996. Securum’s activities were wound down by 1997. The direct financial impact at 
that point was negative but over subsequent years the programme has resulted in a breakeven 
and eventually positive result.  
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These decisions were in themselves amazing given: the state-ownership of Nordbanken, the Social 
Democratic government of the time and cultural context of Sweden at that time. They reaffirmed 
best practice of bank resolutions. The Swedish authorities’ swift and determined actions laid the 
basis for this effective system wide resolution strategy. Securum has become touchstone of 
subsequent successful resolutions the world over, especially during the Credit Crunch/Sovereign 
Crisis. Adoption of this philosophy and actions was instrumental at saving Swedbank and the 
collapse of the Baltic economies during the period 2009-2011.   
 
Ireland 
In 2008 the banking system in Ireland was initially stabilized by a series of capital injections 
accompanied by the establishment of a national AMC (National Asset Management Agency - 
NAMA) in April 2009. The purpose of NAMA is to act a resolution entity; operate acquiring 
property development loans from Irish banks in return for government bonds; and managing the 
restructuring and resolution of the legacy portfolio legacy exposures related to property 
developers, commercial real estate (CRE) and land assets. This legacy portfolio was equivalent to 
approximately 30% of Irish GDP. These legacy assets were acquired from the six main Irish banks 
at fair market value. 
 
NAMA was established using a “Master SPV” structure. The Irish government avoided NAMA 
being a budgetary  item  as  long  term,  third  party  institutional  investors owned 51%  of  the  
company. Thus NAMA avoided consolidation into the national budget.  The government maintains 
governance oversight through the board of directors. NAMA essentially has three separate 
functions: restructuring, asset management and financing. 
 
NAMA was designed to manage the largest real estate problematic exposures (about 85 groups, 
with over €77 billion in notional value) drawn from the six largest banks. NAMA did not address 
the remaining overhang of smaller ticket legacy real estate and developer loans. The originating 
banks were left to manage the smaller ticket exposures on their own (for which it transpired the 
local banks lacked the skills and capacity to manage – as the government had been warned by 
foreign advisors).  
 
The process and prices for asset identification, valuation and transfer was well designed and 
highly structured to provide transparency, efficiency and avoid ‘moral hazard’. Asset 
identification,  documentation  and  valuation  methods  were  made uniform,  streamlined  and  
centrally directed with  full  use  of digital  resources.  For the transferred assets, valuations were 
made using NAMA’s own “Long Term Economic Valuation”; a controversial method at ‘mark-to-
market’. As a result the transfers were at discounts to book value of on average 56%; with 
individual banks remaining liable for additional losses. A certain liquidity was provided to the 
banks initially in the form of bonds (yet it was insufficient for the needs of the banks which had to 
seek further support from the government). A vendor financing programme has been added to 
facilitate higher bid prices. 
 
Foreign experts and advisors warned the authorities that their efforts remained too limited in 
scope, scale and speed; yet they were ignored.  In subsequent developments, the Irish 
government was forced to effectively nationalize the whole banking system. Policy decisions and 
subsequent macro-events forced Ireland to realize it had a full blown national crisis and was 
forced to seek assistance from the “Troika” (IMF, ECB and EU). Arguably this deepened crisis could 
have been avoided if advice had been heeded at the beginning.   
 
Today, NAMA is part of an overall strategy to resolve the legacy assets, cleanse the banks’ balance 
sheets and establish a new competitive market based on at least two “pillar” banks (i.e.; a 
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reorganized AIB and BOI). NAMA is continuing its operations with asset resolution being effected 
by a combination of workout and true sale transactions. 
 
NAMA is the most radical approach of bank stabilization/AMC to date. The underlying belief is 
that by crystallizing losses upfront will speed up the adjustment process as was the case in 
Sweden a decade earlier )(with Securum) and subsequently with Swedbank and its Baltic Crisis of 
2009-2011. 
 
NAMA operates in an environment of intense transparency, heightened by the role of the Troika 
and has attracted a fair amount of criticism such as the steep discounts applied to asset purchases 
(on average 56%); a larger than anticipated operating budget, valuation and derecognition 
approaches, etc. Despite constraints and limitations, NAMA has registered notable success and 
remains on track to its agreed objectives. NAMA was operational within five months. Its creation 
had an important signaling effect.  
 
As to performance, while still too early to tell indications are that NAMA has been at least a partial 
success. A final assessment needs to be considered in terms of NAMA and the broader economic 
impact.  In the 21 month period to December 2012, NAMA has assessed 700 business plans 
(covering 97% of its loans), made 6,000 individual credit decisions approved close to €1 billion in 
advances of working and development capita and approved asset sales of more than €7 billion. 
NAMA maintains that it is on track to reach its publicly stated goals of repaying €7.5 billion of its 
debt by the end of 2013, €16.5 billion by the end of 2017 and €7.0 billion by end of 2019. 
 
Germany 
In 2008 capital injections and balance sheet guarantees were used to stabilize the banking sector 
in Germany after the fall-out of the US real estate crisis. This left German banks with toxic CDO 
and ABS structures  of  some  €300bn  with  the  German  regional  state  banks  (“landesbanks”)  
most  severely affected. In addition, Hypo Real Estate (HRE) had to be nationalized to avoid a 
systemic bank failure due to the resulting interbank lending squeeze.  In addition, new legislation  
was enacted  to  create  a voluntary programme with the establishment of a financing agency 
(SoFFin) and resolution structures: AMCs (for the landesbanks) and SPVs (for privately owned 
banks). A programme was formalized under the control of a national agency - FMSA (Federal 
Market Stabilization Fund). This programme would allow for full deconsolidation of non-core and 
toxic assets as well as for loss recognition over time. In addition, the government had intended to 
facilitate mergers in the landesbank segment. By 2010 two AMCs were created for each 
participating bank: WestLB/EAA and HRE/FMS Wertmanagement. 
 
The SPV approach was not utilised. It was seen as too expensive, as it required upfront loss 
recognition of 10% and a further recognition of the difference between “fundamental value” (a 
proxy for market value) and book value over time. Furthermore, the German authorities have 
managed to lessen the impact of loss crystallization at the banks by passing specific legislation 
that makes the AMCs a “legally privileged” entity. The banks could opt to wait and not crystalize 
losses before an eventual default of the structure. 
 
The success of the AMC approach has been limited as the intended potential mergers between 
the landesbanks could not be resolved politically. One of the imposed conditions has been the 
commitment for the core banks to be sold to new owners. Instead the individual states have 
opted to save their landesbanks by keeping them outside of the SoFFin umbrella thus avoiding 
consolidation (e.g. HSH, Bayern LB, LBBW). KfW managed to sell IKB to Lone Star with massive 
vendor financing.  To date In Germany, true asset resolution has not materialized, as the 
programme’s elements create an incentive to delay loss recognition (e.g. original capital 
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contribution and additional unlimited guarantees) for future losses of EAA for the owners of 
WestLB (e.g. the State of North-Rhine Westphalia and the Savings Banks association). 
 
While the German government’s objectives of stabilization have been met, resolution of the toxic 
portfolios remain incomplete:  left to the private sector for the stronger commercial banks and in 
the case of the FMSA banks obviated. FMSA has been successful in its limited objectives 
(warehousing rather than resolution). This situation has fostered a large set of “zombie” banks; 
caught in wind-down mode rather than true asset resolution. 
 
 
2.5  Bank Stabilization 
From the international examples, two basic principles that shape strategic approaches can be derived: 
1. Deconsolidation (i.e., on balance sheet vs. off balance sheet) and  
2. Legal structures (i.e., structured vs. management solutions).  
 
These strategic approaches can be categorized into four broad types: Asset Protection Schemes (APS); 
SPVs; Internal Restructuring Units (IRUs) and AMCs, (Exhibit 5) 
 
Exhibit 5: Basic principles of Bank Stabilization  
 
While structured solutions are generally intended to solve for capital relief, management solutions are 
intended to demonstrate transparency and a willingness to implement asset resolution strategies through 
increased management focus . 
 
As can be derived from individual bank stabilization efforts, the application of these two principles are not 
mutually exclusive. In many cases they follow a pattern from structured solutions to management 
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Exhibit 6: Bank stabilization – selected examples 
 
 
In circumstance of industry-wide weakness, very few banks can effect such resolutions on their own. For 
example,  Dresdner  Bank  was  able  to  resolve  its  legacy  portfolio  on  its  own,  yet  UBS  required 
government  assistance.  The case of Securum (as previously discussed) demonstrates  how  a  well- 
structured, centrally driven strategy can realize effective asset resolution and see the return of a vibrant 
and healthy bank (Nordea) that helped restore confidence in the crisis effected Swedish banking sector of 
the mid-1990s. These experiences were later applied in 2009 in the case of Swedbank which during the 
current crisis successfully resolved on its own its legacy portfolios in Sweden and the Baltics republics. Yet, 
it is important to note that government assistance forms a part of almost all the approaches to varying 
degrees.  
 
These approaches revealed a policy challenge for BdE: to encourage appropriate stabilization strategies 
for individual banks while realizing the resolution of the overall legacy portfolio. 
 
This pattern reflects the Spanish regulators’ strategy and direction to foster asset resolution in order to 
demonstrate progress in solving the banking crisis. Given the situation, asset resolution strategies for the 
legacy portfolio need to be prioritized; at least for a set of weaker Spanish banks. 
 
 
2.6 Asset Resolution 
Overall banks can follow four main asset resolution strategies:  (i)  Workout;  (ii)  Straight  Sale;  (iii)  SPV  
Sale;  (iv)  AMC  Sale.  The main considerations  in applying one or the other of these resolution strategies 
are: loss recognition; deconsolidation; liquidity; upside potential; and competition (Exhibit 7). These 
considerations are always shaped by the applicability of relevant regulations, practices and laws at both a 
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Exhibit 7: Comparison of Resolution strategies 
 
 
Workout strategies are the traditional way of dealing with problematic assets on an individual basis. Banks 
strengthen their own internal work out (so-called “intensive care”) or restructuring units as well as legal 
departments (with a focus on foreclosure) to effect resolutions on an individual borrower level. This 
strategy is most effective in situations where time to resolution is not an issue. The belief being that 
balance sheets can be managed to match operational profit generation and investor needs. In Spain, 
during the period of 2012, this assumption not valid. However, it is conceivable that 
workout will remain the dominant strategy due to a lack of incentives and alternatives. 
 
Under normal circumstances straight sale is the preferred option outside of workout, due to its simple and 
clear characteristics. Assets are sold (commonly to an SPV set-up by the investor) for cash or cash 
equivalents. However, one major precondition for straight sales to work is the availability of leverage for 
the investor; as it allows for higher bids to close the gap between investor and bank IRR assumptions. 
Vendor financing is an option, but it faces deconsolidation issues as the amount of vendor financing would 
have to be well beyond the threshold of expected portfolio losses. From a regulatory perspective a safe 
limit would be found around 50% level. A work-around would be an agreement by the SPV to finance 
resulting property sales to investors. 
  
In an SPV/AMC sale, a joint venture approach with the investor is taken, where the bank tries to retain 
upside potential through a minority shareholding (and/or cash flow waterfall arrangements, return 
hurdles, etc.) in the Asset SPV/AMC. In this approach there are several main differences. The eligibility of 
asset classes where performing non-strategic loans can only be accommodated in an AMC only. For the 
asset management structure in an SPV, the asset management is effected through an investor 
owned/appointed servicing platform; while for an AMC, the bank platform can be retained by the 
investor.   
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In both SPV/AMC cases, the ability of the selling bank to influence resolution management has to be 
effectively blocked in order to allow for appropriate de-recognition. As in the above straight sale, 
deconsolidation/external financing remains the key issue limiting theses exit strategies.  The joint and 
several liability with the originating “good” bank is an additional constraint for the AMC sale as it 
dependent upon the amount of hived down/spun-off liabilities. 
 
In terms of regulatory capital relief, each transaction would have to be analyzed individually. In general, 
derecognition of the assets would lead to capital relief, while the recognition of losses as a result of the 
transaction would counteract this effect. 
 
Spanish accounting rules and laws are similar to other EU countries and, in the case of accounting rules, 
are based on IFRS. In countries where successful bank resolution structures have been applied, such as 
Sweden, Ireland or Germany, significant and specific amendments to these rules, policies and laws were 
implemented in order to allow the appropriate implementation of successful resolution structures. For 
example, even in  the US, the  authorities’ decision to change mark-to-market accounting for illiquid assets 
(FAS 157) was the main reason to keep toxic assets on balance sheets and limit the success of P-PIP. 
 
BdE has a tradition of robust interpretation but a reluctance to set industry wide precedents. At its 
discretion, BdE has the authority to interpret the application of IFRS rules for Spanish financial institutions. 
It can therefore facilitate the creation of practical resolution structures. The establishment of a central 
financing agency and/or AMC, as recommended by expert practitioners, and precedent examples, would 
avoid the need to significantly alter prevailing accounting rules since it would facilitate the execution of 
SPV/AMC sale transactions which would result in complete derecognition and deconsolidation of the 
assets. The key national accounting rules and legal issues with regard to de-recognition and 
deconsolidation of assets remain a source of resistance rather than inspiration for reluctant participants 
and regulator; the latter often conveniently forgetting that it sets the rules.  
 
A ranking of these alternatives from an individual bank’s perspective is highly dependent on its loss 
absorption capacity and the intended speed of execution.  
 The fastest and likely most expensive solution is the formation and subsequent sale of an AMC, as 
it enables the bank to dispose of all legacy asset classes in one transaction.  
 However, in reality it is more advisable to begin with a focused workout approach, i.e. by forming 
an IRU and targeting individual solutions. In this approach value can be added quickly through 
workout initiatives coupled with an attempt to offload individual pools of assets through targeted 
straight sale or SPV/JV solutions. The remaining rump portfolio would be disposed of through a 
hive-down and sale of the resulting AMC. The important criteria are the financial impacts of non- 
resolution and time available to achieve it. 
 
From the Regulator’s perspective helping the banks to help themselves is always the preferred route. 
However, in the case of an intensifying crisis (as was the case in Spain 2012), the Regulator might be well 
advised to sidestep other alternatives and implement the AMC solution upfront in order to avoid systemic 
failure (as was the motivating factor in the case of both Sweden and the United States) or be forced to act 
in a reactive, ultimately unnecessarily costly fashion in the future (as was the case in Ireland). 
 
 
2.7  The Role of a Central Agency 
The role of a central agency is discussed in terms of the financing and possible asset management 
solutions: the break the vicious cycle of financing and central solutions. 
 
Breaking the vicious cycle of financing. Financing is a fundamental constraint that limits asset resolution; 
especially at scale. It sets in motion a vicious cycle of financing (Exhibit 8). In an environment of declining 
asset values and low transaction volumes, the resulting uncertainty has a negative impact on resolution. It 
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leads to high investor IRR requirements and lack of leverage. The banks have little incentive by domestic 
or foreign banks to finance NPL trades (at least not at high leverage ratios). As a result, the gap between 
bid and ask prices on individual transactions is too high, preventing transactions.  These  factors  place  
additional  pressures  on the  price  discovery  process;  leading  to a further decline in asset prices as a 
result as the market tries to find an equilibrium point. 
 
Exhibit 8: Vicious cycle of financing 
 
 
Central solutions for the Spanish banking crisis. By 2012, the Spanish government should consider three 
main options to develop an overall strategy to resolve the large pool of legacy assets. 
1. Rely on the recent provisioning guideline to help bridge the valuation gap. 
2. Tackle market failure by providing a central financing solution. 
3. Create an asset holding structure as a fallback. 
 
Any solution needs to be tailored to take into account the specific situation and the national context. 
International examples do provide useful lessons, both positive and negative in nature. These solutions 
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Exhibit 9: Central solutions 
 
 
These solutions are assessed below. 
 
Wait and See 
A “Wait and See” solution, while attractive for a number of reasons (as it relies on market forces 
and requires little state intervention or support) might be appropriate based on an assumption 
that the recent provisioning initiative is sufficient. The “lawn-mower” approach (i.e. a one size fits 
all haircut) to provision requirements on land and unfinished developments will most likely lead to 
over-provisioning in a few selected situations. Therefore the potential exists for certain banks to 
enjoy extraordinary profit generation by selling those few assets at prices above the provisioning 
levels to all equity investors. It is difficult to predict the appropriateness of this solution.  
Implementation of the provisioning initiative will take some time. Also the granted exemptions to 
merger banks will most likely limit the asset pipeline that could come to the market. Time 
pressures on the economy need to be considered as well. 
 
Central Financing Agency 
Therefore to overcome these time and efficacy issues, a central financing agency could be 
established immediately  to  facilitate  a  more  proper  functioning  of  the  NPL  market.  In  
would  provide  timely assistance by: creating a larger asset pipeline and allowing investors to 
increase their bid levels. In a positive scenario, the resulting liquidity would help to arrest 
uncertainty with regard to asset prices and therefore mitigate decline factors. Obviously this 
intervention could be seen as a subsidy to banks and investors with taxpayers (Spanish or 
European) funds. Therefore, it would be an important design element that this agency be 
structured to participate in any upside of the intended market recovery as well as being limited in 
scope as to its portfolio and duration. 
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Asset Management Agency - general 
There is a chance, that the bid/ask gap cannot be closed at this stage even with the combination 
of new provisioning initiatives and financing subsidies. In which case the Spanish government will 
face the decision to either: (i) reiterate on the provisioning exercise and/or; (ii) allow the agency 
to step into failed auctions to acquire assets at “fair value” (to be defined in a central valuation 
initiative). This entails creating a fully-fledged and focused Asset Management Agency for 
resolution of the legacy assets. This agency is seen as an end-game solution. It would seem that 
the design of any financing agency should have these AMC elements already incorporated at its 
outset, to be activated, if and when required. 
 
Depending on the discussions with global authorities (i.e., the ESM and IMF) another possible 
consideration might be to sidestep these staged approaches and move forward into a full-fledged 
AMC model immediately. There are  advantages  and  disadvantages  to  establishing  this  
national  AMC  either  through  a  centralized (i.e., Securum or NAMA style), or a decentralized 
(FMSA like) approach. 
 
Asset Management Agency – centralized version 
In the centralized approach, assets are to be transferred at market prices and managed centrally 
by a newly created asset management platform which would have full responsibility for managing 
the resolution portfolio. Following characteristics reflect better international practices: Ireland’s 
NAMA is an extreme form. The centralized asset management agency should have the following 
characteristics: 
 Established as a separate and private company, preferably as an SPV with the government 
having a 49% participation (compliance with ESA 95). 
 Have an independent board of directors and clear corporate governance to protect 
government interests. 
 Be granted an open-ended government guarantee and fully capitalized to manage its 
designated portfolio of problematic loans and assets. 
 Operate as a centralized asset management company with incentive mechanisms to 
agreed objectives, targets and KPIs to facilitate sustainable, market-based resolutions. 
 Utilizing a core team of appropriate professional staff with additional capacity being most 
cost efficiently filled by the use of subcontracted services based on need. 
 
Asset Management Agency – decentralized version 
In a decentralized approach the same basic organization requirements would be needed as each 
bank would hive-down or spin-off its legacy assets at book value (fully provisioned according to 
the provisioning rules) into a subsidiary AMC which is subsequently sold the central AMC. This 
approach reflects the experiences in Sweden and Germany. In the German model there is no sale, 
original shareholders would continue to be fully liable for future losses, which works in the case of 
German states as shareholders, but not for commercial banks or its shareholders). Asset business 
plans would be created de-centrally and would have to be signed off by a central asset 
management committee under pre-defined circumstances. 
 
The advantages of the decentralized approach are that it would cover all asset classes (including. 
performing loans), enable the selling banks to retain upside potential while limiting the downside 
to this equity stake. It would also ease the problem of central asset management platform 
creation as it would rely on existing bank workout staff and systems with a small credit committee 
like structure on top to govern asset resolution, where the de-centralized AMCs would resort to 
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2.8  Implementation Considerations 
The main implementation considerations are with regard to: the agency set-up; the creation of the asset 
pipeline; and the management of the sales process (Exhibit 10). Competition issues are considered 
separately. 
 
Exhibit 10: Implementation considerations 
 
There are three main implementation areas discussed below: Agency set-up; Creating the Asset pipeline; 
Managing the sales process. 
  
Agency-Setup 
The central agency requires a core financial functionality. Yet it would probably also best be 
served by full asset management functions to effect restructuring as well as resolution activities. 
 
The core of the agency set-up is a structured financing programme which establishes the ground 
rules for the agency’s involvement in future legacy asset transactions. The program would be 
structured around the key financing offer, such as a percentage of leverage and percentage of 
equity participation by the agency (such as 85% and 49% as used in P-PIP). 
 
In essence the state would issue guarantees for all debt instruments. The asset holding SPV would 
issue bonds to the selling bank. The agency and the investor would acquire shares in the SPV for 
cash. In addition  the  central  agency  would  have  to  provide  its  share  in  the  servicing  fees  of  
the  asset management platform run by its co-investors. 
 
In order to qualify for the programme, investors would have to be approved (e.g. by becoming 
part of a investor board) and bound to participate in the standardized auction process to be 
established. Participating banks would be required to create transparency of their asset pipeline 
and follow the standardized auction process. The standardized auction and asset pipeline 
processes are described in the following sections. Standardization is intended to minimize costs in 
general legal and advisory fees which are better spend in data quality and data room preparation. 
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The agency set-up for the financing agency could be organized in different ways, but it would 
need to be an independent entity. 
 
In Spain 2012, the financing agency could be an extension of the FROB budget since it focuses on 
guarantees and equity participations. It could also be appended to the DGF. 
 
In case that an extension of activities is required to lead restructuring and resolution activities 
then a dedicated AMC would need to be established. This asset holding agency would incorporate 
the existing financing capabilities, in addition to adding both an asset holding SPV structure and a 
servicing platform (outsourced). 
 
Funding was the most important aspect in both cases. It was estimated that the book value of 
legacy assets was €220bn (after provisioning and add-ons; €138bn performing and €82bn non-
performing) a complete offloading would need € 44bn in new equity and € 176bn in guarantees. 
These estimates exceed the current FROB or ICO capacities by a wide margin. Unless transactions 
are expedited in the escalated central asset management model (as described above), the 
investment could be staged with some recycling effects on guarantee fees and dividends. 
Obviously the effect of such initiative on the national debt and deficit implications need to be 
considered; potentially following an ‘Irish’ solution (e.g.,51% of NAMA held by investors). 
 
While this staged approach has merit (i.e. financing agency first, asset management as a fall-back), 
it needs to be designed such that key milestones for escalation are established and can be 
implemented quickly to avoid poor signalling, lost time, and increased costs. 
 
Creating the Asset Pipeline 
Currently, the transparency of the asset base available for sale is quite limited. BdE focuses on 
developer loans and classifies them into “performing” and “non-performing”; where the non-
performing part falls into the sub-segments land, unfinished developments and rest. Clearly, from 
a management perspective a much deeper segmentation will be required in order to assess 
volumes of transactions that might come to market. 
  
From a credit perspective this deeper segmentation should be as follows: 
 Performing loans should at the very least be broken into performing and sub-performing 
(i.e. in arrears < 30, 60, 90 days). 
 Non-performing  should  follow  the  logic  of:  workout,  termination,  foreclosure,  1st,  
2nd,  3rd auction. 
 In addition, the segmentation should be done by exposure type, e.g. mortgage loan, 
leasing, credit line (drawn, un-drawn) and guarantees (performance vs. payment). 
 Collateral information would have to take into account: 1st vs. 2nd lien mortgages, cash 
and state guarantees and other. 
 Property information would have to be structured around property categories (office, 
retail, logistics,  hotel/leisure,  residential,  land)  and  include  completion  status  and  
year,  location, square meters, rental status and income, valuation, valuation date and 
valuer-appraiser. 
 Land would in addition have the categories of agricultural, zoning, building permission 
(type). 
 
With this information at hand, more transparent and investor-oriented data tapes can be 
constructed and asset pipelines can be developed on both an individual bank level and on an 
aggregate level. 
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At a minimum, under and scenario/strategy individual originating banks need to be encouraged, if 
not directed, to develop accurate data-tapes, based on collateral databases. Such information is 
usually sufficient to meet the minimum investor’s requirements as part of an established due 
diligence process. It also obviates unnecessary time delays and costs as the banks’ systems will not 
produce the requisite level of information. Such a data-tape standard could be imposed as part of 
any participation in a central financing agency programme. At a more structured extreme a 
complete information system could be imposed, as would be the case for a centralized or national 
AMC. This system would set the only means possible  by  which  the  banks’  legacy  portfolios  
would  be  assessed  and  agreed  for  transfer.  The experience from NAMA reveals that such a 
system is a necessary precondition for future resolution success; despite its time to establish and 
costs (set-up and administration). 
 
Valuation and provisioning always need to be synchronized. A “lawn-mower” approach does 
provide some incentives to act, i.e. active steps towards resolution vs. passive strategies. 
However, proven best practices to determine accurate provisions on NPLs is to apply cash flow 
discounting based on fair value of the underlying collateral for each individual exposure and asset. 
 
In the absence of a liquid market property valuation has its challenges. For income generating 
properties the issue is less complex as the arguments would centre around yield requirements and 
the availability of financial leverage per asset type and location. For non-income generating 
property, the absence of comparables is much more difficult to overcome, since key valuation 
parameters would have to be estimated, e.g.,  for  land  one  would  have  to  take  a  view  on  
time  to  market,  construction  time, construction cost, sales price and discount rate in order to 
arrive at a sensible valuation. Market practice in Sweden and the Baltic states suggests that the 
establishment of a national valuation board to determine values for the main valuation 
parameters is an efficient way to remove some uncertainty about asset valuation and provide a 
basis for provisioning instructions and transaction reserve prices. 
  
Managing the Sales Process 
Once the data-tape and asset valuation is established, a standardized sales process should be put 
in place. This process would have to be run as an auction to preserve the competitive argument 
needed when taxpayer money is deployed. After a standard non-disclosure agreement (NDA) is 
signed by the investors, an information memorandum and data-tape are issued with a 
requirement for an indicative bid. Based on the indicative bid, bidders are allowed into the data 
room phase, where asset files can be reviewed and questions asked via a standardized Q&A 
process. In parallel, using an agreed sales and purchase agreement (SPA), negotiations as to the 
key commercial points (e.g. reps and warranties, caps, de minimis) will need to be agreed. The 




2.9  Competition implications 
It is outside the scope of this working paper to suggest a rational consolidation strategy for the Spanish 
banking market. However relevant issues can be identified and are discussed below. 
 
Both bank stabilization as well as resolving the overhang of legacy assets have a competition dimension.  
In an EU context, the European Competition Agency‘s (ECA) approval along transparent lines is a 
necessary pre-condition of any merger or nationalization. Any proposed commercial merger or 
nationalization must take these criteria into account.  In the case of nationalization, a wind-down plan for 
the non-core/legacy assets needs to be approved and the disposal of the remaining core banking franchise 
within a proscribed date (in keeping with the principle of proportionality). Furthermore the disposal of any 
assets from the non-core must also be approved by the ECA. Precedent examples would suggest that a 
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proactive discussion of any plan would allow for a more pragmatic design of the conditional exemptions to 
take into account the market conditions. 
 
In the four precedent international examples only the German and Irish governments have had a 
predetermined competitive landscape. The Swedes were more concerned with preserving the status quo, 
although there was a wave of second tier bank mergers after the crisis; yet preseving the four bank 
oligopoly that remains today. 
 
Governments and regulators need to consider whether they wish to actively steer certain constellations  
or  create  the  environment  and  conditions  that  will  allow  market  forces  to  act naturally. While 
consolidation is often viewed as a means to shift the burden and costs of restructuring and resolution 
directly on the sector and shareholders it invariably has an impact on competitiveness. Also the ability of 
all the banks to cope is far from certain. 
  
Since 2009, Spanish governments and BdE have been successful in demutualising the cajas and forcing 
their initial consolidation (45 cajas merging into 11 banks today). This policy and process has been 
mirrored by the actions of the FROB with has seen its active intervention in three former cajas and one 
commercial bank with the subsequent disposal to date of two of these to commercial banks. Also FROB 
has made equity injections into another three former cajas. Furthermore, the domestic commercial banks 
have been encouraged to consolidate and there are six such larger institutions today. 
 
For an economy of Spain’s size and dynamism it is possible to imagine that this overall consolidation 
process  needs  to  continue  over  the  next  few  years  as  natural  process  to  return  the  sector  to 
economic health. Inevitably, the competitive landscape will be affected by the continuing dynamics of the 
credit/sovereign crisis and resolution strategies undertaken 
 
 
2.10 Summary and Conclusions 
Since  the  financial  crises started in 2008,  BdE  and  the  Spanish  authorities have  taken steps  to 
stabilize the banking sector. However a significant pool of non-performing and repossessed assets remains 
to be resolved. The functioning of the NPL market is impeded by a number of factors; most particularly a 
lack of financing. This factor and others allow individual banks to avoid crystallizing their losses.  
 
This vicious cycle needed to be broken. Insufficient resolution actions (at an individual bank level and 
system-wide) threatened to prolong and even deepen the effects of the current crisis; which could be 
made worse by macro and external events beyond the control of the Spanish government. 
Precedent examples reveal that governments taking proactive and directed approaches have realised 
their objectives to fix and restore the banking sector; limiting the effects of the crisis as well as reducing 
the time and cost elements and impact of debt and deficit levels. Such approaches harness the resources 
of supranational agencies to facilitate restoration of the banking sector to its proper function. 
 
Making available appropriate financing within an overall resolution framework would provide the 
necessary  support  and  pre-conditions  to  facilitate  the  necessary  asset  resolution  phase  for  the 
Spanish banking sector. BdE was advised to consider taking a proactive and directed approach at two 
levels: 
(i) Encouraging individual banks to pursue a full set of asset resolution strategies, while;  
(ii) Seeing to the establishment of at least an independent central financing agency (with sufficient 
capital) and the ability to expand rapidly its functionality and scope. This central agency, a 
resolution AMC, would be the most appropriate framework to manage the current legacy 
portfolio and best positioned to meet future challenges in a timely, resource and taxpayer 
efficient manner.   
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Adopting such a twin-approach resulted in the creation of SAREB and ongoing resolution of many of the 
banks and cajas. Taking into account proven, precedent examples and following this twin-approach has 
allowed Spain to navigate its way through the current crisis. It is conceivable that following this advice 
earlier would have saved both time and money, for the banking sector and Spanish taxpayers as well as 
citizens better served.  
 
This call for adopting proven practices, rather than delaying for reasons of self-interest and political 
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